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The Forty second Anniversary
of the Leading Indicators
SUMMARY
Forty-twoyears ago Wesley Mitchell and Arthur Burns completed a
brief research report that identified types of economic indicators
that "have been tolerably consistent in their timing in relation to
business cycle revivals and that at the same time are of sufficiently
general interest to warrant some attention by students of current
economic conditions." This study was the first of a long series of
investigations devoted to extending the system of indicators, testing
its performance, explaining the interrelationships among the indica-
tors, and putting the system into practicable form for current use.
Since the leading indicators receive much public attention nowadays,
their reliability is a matter of some importance.
One way to assess reliability is to examine the subsequent per-
formance of an early version of the system. For this purpose we have
used the list and classification of indicators established in 1950 and
compared their performance before World War II with their perfor-
mance since 1948. The pre-1938 information was used in developing
the 1950 list and classification; the post-1948 information of course
was not.
The results demonstrate that taken as a whole the 1950 version of
the indicator system lived up to its promise. The leading indicators
continued to lead and the laggers to lag at each succeeding turn in
the business cycle. The degree of consistency in performance after
Reprinted from Contemporary Economic Problems, 1979, William Feilner, ed.
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979).
369370 Forecasting
1948 was not very different from what it was before 1938. The rela-
tionships exhibited in earlier cycles resembled those that appeared in
subsequent cycles.
Nonetheless, changes did occur. Certain indicators that appeared
to lag in earlier cycles moved more promptly in later ones. Some
indicators, especially those expressed in current prices, failed to con-
form to recent business cycles. These and other changes, particularly
the availability of new statistical information, have produced many
modifications in the system of indicators that promise to enhance
its usefulness and to reduce its limitations as a guide to the future.
ORIGINOF THE NBER LEADING
INDICATORS
Forfour years the U.S. economy had been recovering from a depres-
sion. Nearly as many people were then employed as had been at the
peak prior to the slump, but unemployment was still high, and the
price level was rising again. In an effort to keep up with rising gov-
ernment spending social security taxes were raised. Concerned about
inflation, the Federal Reserve raised reserve requirements sharply.
Interest rates shot up. By May the recovery had stopped dead in its
tracks, and one of the steepest recessions in history began, erasing
much of the gain of the four year recovery.
Let me hasten to note that the period just described, despite a
superficial resemblance, is not 1979. It was 1937. The recovery was
from the Great Depression, and it lasted from March 1933 until
May 1937. By coincidence, the most recent recovery also began
in March—that is, in March 1975, although the recession that pre-
ceded it was brief and mild by comparison with the 1929—1933
decline. Whether the recovery stops in 1979, as it did in 1937, we
are far better equipped today to detect a recession in its early stages,
to measure its extent and consequences, and hence to take steps
promptly to deal with it.
This is partly because of what happened in 1937. In the late
summer Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., asked the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a private organiza-
tion devoted to objective studies of business cycles and other eco-
nomic problems, to draw up a list of statistical series that would
best indicate when the recession would come to an end. Wesley C.
Mitchell,then the NBER's director of research and a renowned stu-
dent of business cycles, enlisted the help of Arthur F. Burns, who
later headed the NBER and still later became chairman of the Fed-
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sentedto the Secretary set forth a list of the most reliable indicators
of cyclical revivals, explained how they were selected, and included a
record of their past performance. It was published in May 1938.2
Thus was born the first set of leading, coincident, and lagging indi-
cators that are now widely used to forecast, detect, measure, and
appraise recessions and recoveries. In the summer of 1938 they were
put to their first test. The recovery began in June, and the first
signs of its appearance were registered in the leading indicators that
Mitchell and Burns had identified.
Mitchell and Burns drew on an encyclopedic knowledge of the
history and theory of business cycles as well as on an enormous stock
of empirical information that had been assembled since the 1920s at
the NBER. It was a resource that could be called upon as needed, as
Secretary Morgenthau recognized. During the next four decades the
continuing studies of business cycles at the NBER, in the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, and elsewhere in this country and abroad led
to many improvements in the system of indicators. They were sub-
jected to a series of tests of performance as new business cycles came
upon the scene and as new techniques for managing the economy
were applied.
SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCE OF THE
1950 LIST OF INDICATORS
The degree of confidence that any method of analysis attains, and
deserves, depends upon its performance after it has been developed.
It must be subjected to trial with new data, not used at the time the
method was devised and preferably not even available at that time.
This kind of test of the leading indicators has indeed been made more
than once. In 1950 I examined the performance of the Mitchell-
Bums list of indicators at the 1937 peak and 1938 trough of the
business cycle, since the data they had used in their analysis ended
with the 1933 trough. The test broadly supported their results, but
many new series had become available, new findings from research
suggested additional materials, and the analysis needed to be ex-
tended to cover downturns as well as upturns. Hence a new list and
classification of indicators, based on records available through 1938,
was published in 1950.
Ten years later, in 1960, another review was undertaken, and in
1966 still another, both under the auspices of the NBER.4 In 1972
the Department of Commerce initiated an extensive review, publish-
ing the results in 1975. Some of the indicators originally selected
by Mitchell and Bums have survived all these tests of performance.372 Forecasting
Thelength of the average workweek in manufacturing establishments vant ti
andthe index of common stock prices are examples. Others have lied ir
been dropped altogether or replaced by similar series, and new series ences
have been added. It is of some interest, however, to take a long look econo]
back to see how the initial system behaved in subsequent business cyclic
cycles up to the present. For this purpose it will be more productive it coy
to concentrate on the 1950 list and classification of indicators rather forme
than the 1938 list of Mitchell and Burns. The 1950 study, as already much,
noted, covered both peaks and troughs, and the classification system in succ
bears a closer resemblance to the system now used. Furthermore, sures
current data for each of the series in the 1950 list, or close equiva- proces
lents, are published in the Commerce Department's monthly Busi- data c
ness Conditions Digest and hence are conveniently available. The ships,
data record employed in the 1950 study ended with the 1938 busi- cycles.
ness cycle trough. The test will pertain to the period from 1948 to By
1975, during which time six business cycles occurred, with peaks in tify, a
1948,1953,1957,1960, 1969, and 1973 and troughsin 1949, 1954, shown
1958,1961, 1970, and 1975. tender
Theprincipal question to be examined is whether, at these twelve in the
turning points in the economy, the indicators selected and classified a way
in 1950 lived up to the performance suggested by their record prior achiev
to 1938. Did the leading indicators lead and the lagging indicators quenci
lag? Was their behavior as consistent as their previous record would orders
lead one to expect? What deficiencies became evident and why? The and sc
answers can tell something about the effectiveness of the method cycles
used to develop the information, as well as the degree of historical some
continuity in the economic processes that give rise to business cycles, that t
In 1950, when I began this research, business cycles had been observ
puzzling scholars for more than a century, and efforts to prevent could
panics, crises, and depressions had long engaged the attention of law- a com
makers and government officials. Mitchell and others had studied a busifle]
large number of hypotheses, theories, or models of how business suasive
cycles came about. No single theory had proved adequate for all time grounc
or all countries, and the evidence bearing upon the phenomenon was future,
scattered and lacked uniform treatment. Mitchell had come to be- disapp
lieve that the most promising line of attack was to organize syste- The
matically and comprehensively the statistical evidence for a long and th
periodof time and for several countries and then to use these data to Table
develop an accurate description of business cycle phenomena as well able tc
as to test various hypotheses and to suggest new ones. ment t
As a result, the NBER. in 1950 had a large collection of economic civiliar
time series in monthly, quarterly, or annual form extending back in But es
time as far as each series could be compiled and pertaining to the ports I
types of economic process that previous investigators believed rele- ees amThe Forty-second Anniversary of the Leading Indicators 373
ment vant to the generation of business cycles. The series had been classi-
s have fied into economic groups deemed most useful in explaining differ.
series ences in cyclical behavior or in accounting for the influence of one
g look economic variable on another. Finally, a standard set of measures of
isiness cyclical behavior had been calculated for each series for the period
uctive it covered. The measures showed how consistently the series con-
rather formed to business cycles, whether they led or lagged and by how
Iready much, what rate of change and pattern of movement they exhibited
ystem in successive cycles and on the average, and so on. From these mea-
more sures one could trace the relationships among numerous economic
aquiva: processes during the periods of prosperity and depression that the
r Busi- data covered, examine what changes had occurred in these relation-
The ships, and develop a systematic, reasoned account of past business
busi- cycles.
48 to By summarizing a portion of this information, I was able to iden-
aks in tify, among these relevant types of economic process, those that had
1954, shown highly consistent conformity to business cycles and dominant
tendencies either to lead, to coincide with, or to lag behind the turns
;welve in the economy as a whole. I used statistical significance tests as
;sified a way of reducing the likelihood that a certain record had been
prior achieved by chance. It became clear that there were systematic Se-
cators quences inthe movements of different economic variables, such as
would orders, production, employment, inventories, prices, interest rates,
r?The and so on, and that these sequences had persisted over many business
thod cycles during the past half century or more. It was also clear that
orical some changes had occurred in the way the economy worked and
ycles. that they had affected and doubtless would continue to affect the
been observed sequences. Many of the sequences and the changes in them
event could be readily explained or at least rationalized, but many were of
f law- a complex nature that defied simple explanation. The riddle of the
lied a business cycle had not been solved. As a result, although the per-
iness suasiveness of the explanation and the statistical evidence offered
I time grounds for some confidence that the sequences would persist in the
n was future, how much and exactly what would persist and what would
;o be- disappear, and when, were the great unknowns.
;yste- The types of economic process identified and classified in this way
long and the particular time series selected to represent them are shown in
tta to Table 24—1. In virtually every instance, several indicators were avail-
Iwell able to represent a given type of process. For example, for employ-
ment the most comprehensive available series was (and still is) total
mic civilian employment, based upon data from the household survey.
•ck in But estimates of nonfarm employment are also compiled from re-
bthe ports by establishments. They cover a much larger sample of employ-
rele- ees and are documented by payroll records. Hence the latter series is
L374 Forecasting
Table 24-1.The 1950 List of Leading, Coincident, and Lagging Indicators
and their Current Equivalents.
No.
Corresponding Series
Original Series in BCD Currently in
1950 List No.Business Conditions Digest
Leading Group
1.Liabilities of business failures 14. Same
2.Dow-Jones index of industrial 19. Standard and Poor's index of
common stock prices 500 common stock prices
3.New orders, durable goods, 6. Same
value
4.Residential building contracts, 29. New building permits, private
floor space housing units, number
5.Commercial and industrial 9. Same
building contracts, floor space
6.Average workweek, manufacturing 1. Same
7.New incorporations, number 13. Same
8.Wholesale price index, twenty-eight23. Industrial materials price index,
basic commodities thirteen commodities
9.
Roughly Coincident Group
Employment in nonagricultural 41. Same
establishments
10.Unemployment 37. Same
11.Corporate profits after taxes 16. Same
12.Bank debits outside New York 56. Manufacturing and trade sales,
value
13.Freight car loadings 49. Value of goods output in 1972
dollars
14.Industrial production index 47. Same
15.Gross national product, value 200. Same
16.Wholesale price index, industrial 335. Same
commodities
Lagging Group
17.Personal income, value 223. Same
18.Sales by retail stores, value 54. Same
19Consumer installment debt, value 66. Same
20.Bank rates on business loans 67. Same
21.Manufacturers' inventories, book 71. Manufacturing and trade
value inventories, book value
Source: Geoffrey H. Moore, Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals and Reces-
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generallysuperior in its performance as an economic indicator and
was selected to represent the employment process.
Fifteen of the twenty-one series selected as indicators in 1950 are
3tors stillcarried in Business Conditions Digest. More or less close relatives
of the remaining six series can also be found in BCD, as Table 24—1
shows. Because these series represent the same types of process and
es are readily available in a computer data bank, I have used them in
igest testing the subsequent performance of the 1950 list.
Table 24-2 summarizes the lead-lag performance at each business
cycle peak and trough since 1948 for the groups of leading, coinci-
dent, and lagging indicators selected in 1950. The twenty-one series
were classified in the three groups according to their performance
prior to 1938. The leading group (eight series) shows a mean lead at
each business cycle turn except the last trough (March 1975). The
ivate lagging group (five series) shows a mean lag at each turn except the
initial trough (October 1949). The coincident group (eight series)
shows some tendency to lead at peaks but is virtually coincident at
troughs. Since several of the coincident series were used, along with
index, others, to determine the business cycle peak and trough dates, it is
not surprising that they should roughly coincide with these dates.
But the sequence of the turns in the three groups is not determined
by the business cycle dates, and the sequence is in the expected di-
rection for all but one of the twelve dates, the one exception being
the March 1975 trough, where the averages for the leading and the
'sa1es coincident groups coincide.
Table 24-2 also shows that the proportions of timing comparisons
p1972 thatare in the appropriate class in 1948—197 5 are not very different
from the proportions in the period prior to 1938. At peaks, for ex-
ample, 89 percent of the timing comparisons in the leading group
during 1948—197 5 were leads, as compared with 80 percent for the
same group prior to 1938. At troughs, the 1948—1975 percentage of
leads was seventy-one, compared with 81 percent for the pre-1938
period. For all three groups of series together, at both peaks and
troughs, the percentage of timing comparisons that turned out to be
in the appropriate class was almost exactly the same after 1948 (75
percent) as before 1938 (77 percent).
Another aspect of the record that is important to the user of indi-
cators is the likelihood that the indicator will not register a turning
point in the vicinity of the business cycle turn or that it will register
a turning point when no business cycle turn occurs. The record of
the 1950 list of indicators withrespect to the first of these contin-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 1979.
The record, both before and after 1938, reflects the relative sensi-
tivity of the series, with the leading series being most sensitive and
hence skipping few cycles, while the lagging series are the least sensi-
tiveand skip more cycles. In the leading and coincident groups there 2
was little change in performance between the two periods, but in the
lagging group more than twice as large a percentage of turns were
skipped in the recent period. One of the reasons is that business
cycles have been milder in the period since 1948 than before. An-
other is that four of the five lagging series are expressed in current
dollars, and inflation has pulled such series upward even during re-
cessions.
For the second contingency, the problem of false signals, a similar
record is more difficult to obtain. The term "false signal" is not easy
to define, and the 1950 study did not contain this information. Later
work has shown, however, that the leading indicators are more sub-
ject to extra cycles that do not match the business cycle chronology,
while the lagging indicators, again reflecting their relative insensitiv-
ity, seldom exhibit extra cycles.6 This difference continued to pre-
vail after 1948, as the following materials demonstrate.
Figures 24-1 through 24-3 present another form of summary of
the performance of the 1950 list of indicators during 1948—1975.
Here the three groups of indicators are combined into indexes by the
method that the Department of Commerce currently uses to con-
struct itsleading, coincident, and lagging indexes.7 The indexes 0
move down during each recession, up during each expansion. The
sequences among their turning points, identified by the use of a 4
computerprogram, are with rare exceptions in accordance with the
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0
Inaddition to the six recessions identified in the charts, three
periods when the indexes declined are not recognized as recessions—
namely, 1951—1952, 1962—1963, and 1966—1967. The usual Se-
quences are observed at these turns also (except that the lagging
.2 index did not decline in 1951—1952 or 1962—1963). Each of these
periods has been identified as a period of slowdown in a chronology
of growth cycles, although some of the sensitive leading indicators
experienced declines as large as those during the business cycle reces-
sions (see the section following).
During a period as long as 1948—1975, some tendency for the
"quality" of the indicators to deteriorate might be expected. Among
particular indicators there have been many instances of such dete-
rioration or at least changes in behavior. Railroad freight car load-
ings, for example, have not kept up with the trend of the economy,
partly because of the increasing share of freight hauled by trucks,
partly because the production of goods has grown more slowly than
services. Inner tube production, one of the indicators in the Mitchell-
Burns list, used to be an interesting indicator because of its sensitiv-
ity to the new car market and the tire repair business. The advent of
the tubeless tire has made the inner tube almost a collector's item,
found mostly around swimming holes. There is a possibility, also, of
selection bias and regression toward the mean. The top performers
selected on the basis of a sample of information covering a certain
period are not all likely to remain at the top in a second sample coy-
ering a different period. Some were at the top by chance in the first
2 sample and are unlikely to remain there in the next. One can guard
against this by making the first sample as large as possible, by apply-
ing significance tests in identifying the top performers, and by using
-' otherinformation that explains why they were at the top or that
supports the choice indirectly. These safeguards were employed in all
the indicator studies, but the possibility of regression bias still re-
mains, as well as deterioration because of economic change.
The lead-lag entries in Table 24—2 give some support to the hy-
pothesis of detorioration. In particular, the average leads of the lead-
z ing group of indicators have diminished at both peaks and troughs.
But this is not decisive, for several reasons. One is that the corre-
2 sponding entries in Table 24-4, columns 3 and 4, for the composite
a' leadingindex based on the 1950 list do not show as clear a trend. A
stronger test, however, can be made by using the entries for the corn-
posite leading index based on the 1975 list, also in Table 24-4. Be-
cause the 1975 list was selected toward the end of the period, one
would not expect a trend toward deterioration in these observations,
and because they are correlated with the entries for the 1950 list
I
I.....,384 Forecasting
(seethe correlation coefficients in Table 24—4), they provide a ADD!
meansfor allowing for some of the cycle-to-cycle variation in the INDI
leadsand lags of the 1950 list. A simple way to do this is to subtract
the entries in columns 9 and 10 from those in columns 3 and 4, Clean
which is equivalent to measuring the leads and lags of the 1950 list exhib
against the 1975 list. On this basis the entries in Table 24—4 give users
some support to the hypothesis of deterioration in the 1950 list, in As
terms of a trend toward shorter leads or longer lags than in its 1975 thou
counterpart.9 The entries in Table 24-2, adjusted in a similar man- perio
ner, give stronger support.'° the b
A further consideration with respect to deterioration is that the Cana
lags of the lagging group appear to have a tendency to lengthen, land
especially at troughs. Coupled with the shortening leads of the lead- have
ing group, this means that the interval between the turns in the lead- coun
ers and those in the laggers has not diminished. More generally, the 1966
sequences among the turns in the three groups of indicators do not same
reveal strong evidence of deterioration, although at troughs the inter- An
vals between the turns in the leading and the coincident groups may from
have shortened and those between the coincident and the lagging to fo
groups may have lengthened. ampi
Table 24-5 summarizes the pre-1938 and post-1948 performance 1950
of each of the twenty-one indicators selected in 1950. About two- dunn
thirds of the series behaved in substantially the same way in the 1957
later period as in the earlier one. That is, the later information sup- the s
ports the earlier classification. Seven of the eight leading indicators of pr
are currently classified in Business Conditions Digest as leading at coinc
both peaks and troughs. The one exception, contracts for commer- indic
cial and industrial building, is now considered leading at peaks and dent
coincident at troughs. Corporate profits, in the coincident group in the 1
1950, is now classified as a leading indicator. Even in the pre-1938 chari
period, however, profits exhibited some tendency to lead by short indic
intervals (note the average lead of two months at both peaks and chan
troughs). Unemployment is no longer considered a coincident mdi- qu
cator, because of its tendency to lead at peaks and to lag at troughs. Ye
Personal income and retail sales, originally classified in the lagging in th
group because they exhibited short lags in the pre-1938 period, have bo
rarely done so since 1948. In addition, inflation has prevented these m th
series from declining in some of the milder recent recessions. For the was t
samereason, the wholesale price index for industrial commodities the 1
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Ovjdea ADDITIONALTESTS OF THE
1flthe INDICATORSYSTEM
subtract
and 4 Clearly, the 1950 list and classification of indicators has continued to
950 ljs exhibit most of the properties it had when it was established. To
4 give users of this system of analysis this result will come as no surprise.
list r, As already noted, several reviews of this sort have been made, al-
1975 though none of them tested the 1950 list for the entire 1948—1975
ar man. period. Moreover, other kinds of tests have been made. One examines
the behavior of the same data in other countries. Investigators in
that the Canada, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zea-
gthen land have done this, and within the past few years Philip Klein and I
e lead- have compiled and analyzed comparable sets of indicators for six
e lead. countries other than the United States. For this purpose we used the
ly, the 1966 list rather than the 1950 list of indicators, but many of the
do not same or similar series are in both lists.1'
e inter- Another kind of test uses the same data but in a manner different
s may from that originally contemplated. The use of the leading indicators
lagging to forecast the magnitude of change in economic activity is an ex-
ample, since information on magnitude of change was not used in the
ance 1950 study of indicators. I began carrying out one test of this sort
t two- during the recession of 1953—1954 and followed it up again in
in the 1957—1958 and in subsequent recessions. The idea was to compare
!fl sup- the severity of the current recession shortly after it began with that
icators of preceding recessions, using the initial changes in the leading and
ing at coincident indicators. The leading indicators generally gave earlier
mmer- indications of the relative severity of the recession than the coinci-
sand dent indicators did.'2 Another test of this sort uses the changes in
)Up in the leading indicators in a regression model to forecast subsequent
4938 changes in the coincident indicators. In these models the leading
short indicators have exhibited some ability to forecast the magnitude of
s and change in GNP, industrial production, or foreign trade one or two
mdi- quarters ahead.'3
iughs. Yet another way to test the data is to compare the turning points
gging in the lagging series with the opposite turns in the leading series. The
1have logic of this comparison was recognized in the 1950 study (as well as
hese in the Mitchell-Burns study that preceded it), but the information
fr the was not used in selecting the lagging or leading indicators. Briefly,
pities the logic is that many of the lagging indicators represent costs of
production (labor costs, interest rates) or factors bearing upon costs
(inventories) and that their movements can have an inverse impact
upon the leading indicators (new orders, housing starts, construction



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































turnsin the lagging indicators will precede downturns in the leading the suW indicators and that downturns in the lagging indicators will precede whenev? upturns in the leading indicators. Moreover, if the connection is suffj. movem ciently close, it should help account for the variation from cycle to By a cycle in the length of leads of the leading indicators. elimina Although the twenty-one indicators in the 1950 list were not to be I specifically examined for this property at the time that they were 1950 ii
selected, the larger list of indicators studied at that time (seventy-five adjusti
leading, twenty-nine coincident, and thirty lagging) did exhibit the adjuste
relationship. Whether the subsequent behavior of the 1950 list con- ology
formed to the earlier behavior of this larger list can therefore be de. patteri
termined (see Table 24—6).
14Atall but two of the forty-one turning The
points since 1885 the upturns in the lagging indicators have preceded plays
the downturns in the leading indicators, and the downturns in the nine g
lagging indicators have preceded the upturns in the leading indica- more
tors. The two exceptions occurred in 1904 and 1908, when the lag- 1959
ging group reached its peak in the same month that the leading group and ir
reached its trough. For nearly seventy years, in other words, there dollan
has been no exception to the rule, site in
Table 24-6 also shows that some of the leads in the inverted but tI
lagging series are exceptionally long, and in those instances, a close but ti
connection with the leads in the leading series is not plausible. At every
the December 1969 business cycle peak, for example, the upturn in at ev
the lagging group that occurred ninety months before the peak could laggin
have little bearing on the downturn in the leading group that oc- th
curred nearly seven years later, ten months before the peak. Yet it is or of
fair to say, on the basis of the entire record covering a ninety year verte
span, that these instances are exceptions and that by and large the s)l
variability of the intervals between the opposite turns in the leading eaton
and lagging groups is not very different from that between the simi- incre
lar turns (see the note to Table 24—6). In this respect the record Th
since 1948 resembles the record prior to 1938. list o
One factor that helps to account for the variability in the intervals same
just described is the influence of long-run growth or the occurrence the 1
of some extraneous event such as a war on the length of leads and tion
lags. The upward trend in the economy affects both leading and thos
lagging indicators and makes for long expansions and short contrac- sible
tions. When both the leading and lagging series are treated positively, judg
the trend has a similar effect on both, tending to delay peaks and to abov
advance troughs. But when the lagging series are treated invertedly, cycl
the trend is inverted also. This tends to increase the intervals between
the troughs in the lagging series and the subsequent peaks in the lead-
ing series and to reduce the intervals between peaks in the laggers andThe Forty-second Anniversary of the Leading Indicators 389
leading the subsequent troughs in the leaders. Theeffect is exaggerated
)recede whenever the trend has a dominant effect relative to the cyclical
is SUffj. movement of the series.
ycle to By adjusting the series for the long-run trend this effect can be
eliminated. In recent years this method of cyclical analysis has come
re not to be known, here and abroad, as the growth cycle approach. The
Y were 1950 list of indicators can also be analyzed in this manner by trend
ItY-five adjusting the composite indexes constructed from them. The trend-
bit the adjusted indexes (Figure 24-4) conform closely to the NBER chron.
St con. ology of growth cycles, and the timing sequences follow the expected
be de- pattern (Table 24—7).
;Urning The trend-adjusted coincident index based on the 1950 list dis-
ceded
Iplaysthe rare property of coinciding precisely at every one of the
the
ininegrowth cycle troughs since 1949 (see column 8). It deviates
dica. more from the peaks, especially in 1960, where the peak prior to the
e 1959 steel strike was higher than the peak that followed the strike,
group and in 1973, where the inclusion of aggregates expressed in current
there dollars, together with rapid inflation, delayed the peak in the compo-
site index until August 1974. The trend-adjusted leading index led all
erted but three of the growth cycle turns, and the lagging index lagged all
close but three. When the lagging index is inverted, however, it leads at
ie. At every turn and by intervals that exceed the leads in the leading index urnin .
ld at every turn but one. The variability of the leads in the inverted
COil lagging index, as measured by the standard deviation, is no greater
than the variability of the lags in the same index treated positively
15 or of the leads in the leading index. Moreover, the leads in the in-
verted lagging index are correlated with those in the leading index,
adin supporting the hypothesis that rapid increases in the lagging mdi-
cators have deterrent effects on the leading indicators, while slow simi- increases or declines have stimulating effects. ecord The behavior of the trend-adjusted indexes based on the 1975
ervals list of indicators, which is also recorded in Table 24—7, supports the
same inference. Indeed the correlation just referred to is stronger in pence '
d the leads based on the 1975 list. Furthermore, there is a high correla.
d tion between the timing observations based on the 1975 list and an those based on the 1950 list. There is also little evidence of the pos- rac- sible deterioration in the timing behavior of the 1950 list when
ely .
d'
judgedby comparison with the 1975 list, a matter that was explored
0 above in terms of data unadjusted for long-term trends. The growth






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHANGESIN THE INDICATOR SYSTEM
SINCE 1950 BCD
No.
Strictly speaking, only three of the twenty-one indicators selected by
the NBER in 1950 are among the twenty-two indicators selected by
I the Commerce Department in 1975. They are the average workweek
in manufacturing, which is a leading indicator in both lists, and non- *
farmemployment and industrial production, which are coincident 6. N
indicators in both lists (see Table 24-8). Many of the remaining *
seriesin the two lists, however, are substantially equivalent in terms 13. N
of the concept represented. Indeed, by the criterion of substantial .C
equivalence, all of the leading indicators in the 1950 list are repre- n.a.at
sentedin the 1975 list. In the coincident and lagging groups there is ti
more variation between the two lists.
*
Theprincipal changes in the 1975 list are as follows:
n.a. V
1. Most of the series in the 1975 list are in deflated form. Al- el
though there are occasions or purposes for which current dollar value
na. ID
series are important, in times of rapid inflation it is useful to distin- 14. L
guish physical from nominal changes. This was not done systemati-
cally when the 1950 list was constructed.
2. The series on new orders and contracts for plant and equip-
ment, constructed initially by Victor Zarnowitz,'5 is an improvement
over the two series in the 1950 list that overlap it in content—new 41.F
orders for durable goods and contracts for commercial and industrial 37.i
construction. The new series can be better matched conceptually 16.
with plant and equipment investment expenditures. The idea for n.a. I
such a series, however, was put forward in the report on indicators 47.1
by Mitchell and Burns in 1938. . .
3.The series on net business formation, which takes into account
both the formation of new firms and the discontinuance of existing
firms, improves upon the two series in the 1950 list that are related
to it—new incorporations and liabilities of business failures. The fail-
ure series, however, possesses some value in its own right because of 223.
its bearing on profits, which are not represented at all in the 1975 54.
list (see below). 66.
4. Personal income and retail sales, both of which were used in
current value form in the 1950 list and classified as lagging indica-
tors, are deflated and otherwise modified in the 1975 list and classi- 67.
fiedas coincident. Transfer payments such as social security and
fl
unemploymentbenefits are omitted from personal income in the
1975 series. Since some types of transfer payments move in a coun-
tercyclical manner and the total has been growing rapidly, personal
n.a.: 1
Sourc13. New incorporations, number
9. Commercial and industrial
building contracts, floor space
n.a. Residential building contracts,
floor space
***
n.a.Wholesale price index, twenty-
eight basic commodities
n.a. Dow-Jones index of industrial
common stock prices
14.Liabilities of business failures
41. Employment in nonagricultural
establishments
37. Unemployment, number of persons
16. Corporate profits after taxes
n.a. Bank debits outside New York
47. Industrial production index
200. Gross national product
335. Wholesale price index, industrial
commodities
223. Personal income, value
54.Retail sales, value
66. Consumer installment debt,
value
***




3. Layoff rate, manufacturing
8. New orders for consumer goods
and materials, in 1972 dollars
32. Vendor performance
12. Net business formation
20. Contracts and orders for plant
and equipment, in 1972 dollars
29. New building permits, private
housing units, number
36. Net change in inventories on
hand and on order, in 1972
dollars
92. Change in sensitive prices
19. Standard and Poor's index of
500 common stock prices ***
104.Percent change in liquid assets
105. Money supply (M, ),in1972
dollars
41. Same
51. Personal income less transfer
payments, in 1972 dollars
95. Ratio, consumer installment
debt to personal income
72. Commercial and industrial loans
outstanding
109. Prime rate charged by banks
70. Manufacturing and trade
inventories, in 1972 dollars
91. Average duration of unem-
ployment
62. Labor cost per unit of output,
manufacturing
Table 24-8.Comparison of the 1950 and 1975 Lists of Leading, Coincident,
and Lagging Indicators.
BCD Original Series in BCD Correspondingor New














































Source: See note to Table 24-2.396 Forecasting
incomeexclusive of transfer payments has wider cyclical movements
and closer conformity to the business cycle. This treatment, of
course, does not mean that the broader concept of income is not use-
ful or indeed more relevant in analyzing income-consumption rela.
tionships. Retail sales are combined with manufacturers' and whole-
salers' sales in a comprehensive series on the physical volume of trade
in the 1975 list. This aggregate had not been constructed in 1950,
although the series on bank debits was often used to represent the
total volume of trade.
5. The 1975 list contains only monthly series, whereas the 1950
list included three quarterly series—corporate profits, gross national
product, and bank rates on business loans (the bank rate series be-
came available monthly only in 1977). The omission of quarterly
series is both an advantage and a disadvantage. As a component of a
monthly composite index, a quarterly series must be interpolated to
be included, and as a rule the figures will not be as up to date as the
monthly series. Hence the index will be subject to revision when the
quarterly figures become available, and in any case the interpolation
is an arbitrary procedure. On the other hand, the exclusion of quar-
terly series may mean the omission of a significant economic vari-
able. Probably the most serious omission in the 1975 list is profits.
GNP is partly represented by other series in the coincident group,
and bank rates are reflected in the prime rate, which is the monthly
series included in the 1975 list.
6. No series on inventory change was included in the 1950 list of
leading indicators, whereas the 1975 list includes the change in inven-
tories on hand and on order. In view of the importance of inventory
change as a factor in business cycles, this is clearly a major improve-
ment. Of note, also, is the inclusion of the change in the volume of
goods on order, following the work of Ruth Mack and others.'6
From the buyer's point of view, outstanding orders must be consid-
ered part of the available inventory and subject to close control
through the placement or cancellation of orders. Another series in
the 1975 list that adds to the information on ease or tightness of
market conditions is vendor performance, an indicator pertinent to
the speed with which orders are being filled.
7. The 1975 list contains two series on the volume of means of
payment—the money supply expressed in constant prices and the
rate of change in liquid assets. Concepts of this sort have long had a
place in business cycle theory, and interest in them has broadened
since 1950. The deflated money supply (M,) has fallen victim to
obsolescence since 1975, however, as ways of economizing on the
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vements inclusion of this indicator in the 1975 list has been a mixed blessing,
ent, of and in 1979 it was replaced by a broader concept of money, M2.
not use-
on rela- In addition to the improvements in the list of indicators available
whole- to analysts during the past quarter century, many new devices to
of trade aid the analyst have been developed. Seasonal adjustment is now
1950, routinely accomplished, thanks largely to the development by Julius
ent the Shiskin of a computer program for this purpose. Shiskin was also
responsible for the development of the composite index as a method
e 1950 of summarizing the behavior of a group of indicators that are homo-
ational geneous with respect to cyclical behavior but heterogeneous with
aies be- respectto unit of measurement.17 Charlotte Boschan was largely re-
arterly sponsible for devising computer programs that identify cyclical peaks
nt of a and troughs in time series, that construct patterns of change in time
ated to series during successive periods of recession or of recovery, and that
as the measure long-run trends and growth cycles.'8 These aids to analysis
e have been of enormous value in providing prompt, relevant, compar-
a ion able, and readily understood measures of economic performance.
quar- Without these aids the various publications that present current in-
CV. formationon the state of the business cycle, such as Business Condi-
ro 1
. tionsDigest in the United States, Japanese Economic Indicators in
Japan, and Economic Trends in the United Kingdom, would be far




)rove- Public attention to economic indicators and their analysis in the
me United States as well as in other countries is widespread and grow-
ing. Part of the credit for this belongs to the government publications
rnsid- just mentioned, as well as to the news columns, magazine articles, TV
ntrol coverage, and numerous private reports on the business outlook. Part
Les in belongs to the improvements in the quality, relevance, coverage, and ss of timeliness of statistics pertaining to the economy. Credit must also
1to be given to the continuing research effort devoted to the analysis of
f economic indicators. Without such research, any system of indicators
would soon become obsolete and fall into disrepute.
ad
e But the fundamental fact that both justifies and sustains the pub-
lic attention to economic indicator analysis is the continuity in the
cyclical behavior and interrelationships of economic variables. We
the can learn and have learned from the past. The business cycle experi-
•b the ence of the United States before World War II has proved a useful
guide to business cycles since then. It is this historical continuity that
-j398 Forecasting
underliesthe basic and persistent consistency in the behavior of a set
of indicators during the twenty-five years since they were selected.
No one could be certail:1 of this behavior in 1950. Only by looking
back is it easy to see both the continuity and the significant changes.
Today we can no more foresee the future of economic indicator
analysis than we could in 1950. We can, however, confidently pre-
dict that it will be useful to keep abreast of changes in economic
behavior and to keep devising and testing new methods of analysis.
Research along these lines has paid good dividends in the past and
probably will do so in the future. As new ideas and new findings are
generated by research, they can be applied to the current scene,
spurring interest and broadening understanding.
Two relatively recent developments suggest some directions that
this research might take. One is the application of indicators on a
global scale. Researchers in many countries are pursuing active re-
search programs that apply the techniques of indicator analysis to
data for their own country. Application to the analysis of foreign
trade flows is in its infancy, but the infant shows promise. Appli-
cation to the analysis of the external markets of the developing
nations, as well as to internal aspects of their economies, is also in its
infancy, but the infant is alive and well. Two international agencies—
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in
Paris and the European Economic Community in Brussels—are start-
ing to develop expertise in indicator analysis, and this may encourage
a wider research effort among their member countries and elsewhere.
The second recent development is the application of indicator
analysis to the subject of inflation. Swings in the rate of inflation
have not attracted the sustained attention of researchers to the same
extent that business cycles have. The interest has been more episodic,
associated with periods of wartime inflation, hyperinflation, crisis,
and panic. Perhaps the present period of inflation is merely another
episode, but even if it proves to be such, the application of indicator
analysis to the process of inflation will add to public understanding
of it.
Chronologies of the rate of inflation, constructed for different
countries by methods similar to those used in constructing business
cycle chronologies, have much to teach about where and when infla-
tion is subsiding or accelerating. One of the lessons, for example, is
that none of the major industrial countries of the West has experi-
enced a decline in its rate of inflation without also undergoing, at
about the same time, a slowdown or recession in real economic
growth. Studies of the types of prices, costs, or other factors that
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fa set yield leading indicators of inflation analogous to the leading indica-
lected. tors of business cycles. One of the more obvious bits of evidence
ooking attesting to the need for a wider appreciation of such inflation mdi-
anges. cators is simply this: the record of economic forecasts of inflation
icator reveals a distinct lag in the forecasts relative to the actual rate of in-
Y pre- flation.'9 In part, at least, this lag may be attributable to the fact that
flOmic forecasters have concentrated too much of their attention upon van-
alysis. ables such as capacity utilization rates that do not have a good record
t and in leading or anticipating the rate of inflation. There seems to be no
gs are inherent reason why price forecasts should be more susceptible to
scene, lags than, say, output forecasts. Yet they have been. The construc-
tion of a system of inflation indicators similar to the system that
s that already exists for output may help to improve the record of inflation
on a forecasts.
ye re- Extension of the indicator approach on a global scale and its ex-
Sis to tension to the problem of inflation are but two of the directions
reign requiring research effort. Many other problems, small and large, de-
ppli- mand attention. A fully "deflated" set of indicators has not been pg developed; a satisfactory monthly price-cost ratio is needed; a corn-
in its prehensive monthly series on credit extensions is not available;
lesT measures of the money supply have been suffering from obsoles-
t in cence; and so on. New methods of seasonal adjustment that require
start- less revision when additional data become available must be tested.
urage "Index models" and "stage of process models" that combine the
jiere. indicator and econometric approaches may make both more fruitful.
cator If these and other researches prosper, there may be less resemblance
tion between the indicator system forty years hence and the present sys-
same tern than there is between ,the present system and the one devised
OdiC, when Mitchell and Burns began their work forty-two years ago.
risis,
ither
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